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Introduction 
 
The possibility that the renminbi may soon join the ranks of international currencies has 
generated much excitement. This paper looks to history for help in evaluating the factors 
determining its prospects. The three best precedents in the twentieth century were the rise 
of the dollar from 1913 to 1945, the rise of the Deutsche mark from 1973 to 1990, and the 
rise of the yen from 1984 to 1991. The fundamental determinants of international currency 
status are economic size, confidence in the currency, and depth of financial markets. The 
new view is that, once these three factors are in place, internationalization of the currency 
can proceed quite rapidly. Thus some observers have recently forecast that the RMB may 
even challenge the dollar within a decade. But they underestimate the importance of the 
third criterion, the depth of financial markets. In principle, the Chinese government could 
decide to create that depth, which would require accepting an open capital account, dimi-
nished control over the domestic allocation of credit, and a flexible exchange rate. But al-
though the Chinese government has been actively promoting offshore use of the currency 
since 2010, it has not done very much to meet these requirements. Indeed, to promote in-
ternationalization as national policy would depart from the historical precedents. In all 
three twentieth-century cases of internationalization, popular interest in the supposed pres-
tige of having the country‘s currency appear in the international listings was scant, and 
businessmen feared that the currency would strengthen and damage their export competi-
tiveness. Probably China, likewise, is not yet fully ready to open its domestic financial 
markets and let the currency appreciate, so the renminbi will not be challenging the dollar 
for a long time. 
 
We begin, however, by asking: what is international currency status, and why does it 
matter? 
D E F I NIT I O N S  
An international currency is one that is used outside its home country.
 1  Reserve curren-
cy status is the main measure used in this paper, but it is just one of a number of possible 
measures of international use. The others can be neatly summarized by means of Table 1, a 
simple 2x3 table adapted from versions originally introduced by Cohen (1971) and Kenen 
(1983).  The classic three functions of money domestically—store of value, medium of ex-
change, and unit of account—can be transferred to the level of international money. Under 
each function are important examples of how government authorities and private actors 
sometimes choose to use a major international currency other than their own. The main fo-
cus of this paper appears in the first cell, the decision of central banks to hold their reserves 
in the form of particular currencies. But other possible criteria of an international currency 
also appear in the table: currency substitution (e.g., the circulation of dollar currency in Lat-
in America and elsewhere), invoicing foreign trade and denominating international finan-
cial flows, pegs for smaller countries‘ currencies, and foreign exchange trading.  Statistics 
on the various measures of international currency use are reported in an Appendix. Studies of currency internationalization often focus on reserve currency holdings for 
three reasons. First, annual data for all relevant currencies are available over the past forty-
five years or more; the other international roles that appear in Table 1 are nowhere near as 
comprehensively quantifiable. Second, reserve currency holdings are most relevant to the 
important questions, such as whether the United States will continue to be able to finance 
its current account deficit. Third, the various roles of an international currency are heavily 
interrelated, causally and statistically. 
 
Table 1. Roles of an International Currency 
Function of money  Governments  Private actors 
Store of value  International reserves  Currency substitution 
(private dollarization) 
Medium of exchange  Vehicle currency for foreign 
exchange intervention 
Invoicing trade and 
financial transactions 
Unit of account  Anchor for pegging local  
currency 
Denominating trade and 
financial transactions 
 
S H O U LD   W E   CARE  AB O UT  I NT E RN AT IO N AL  CU RRE N CY   RAN K I N G S ?  
Is the question important of international currency status important? It has fewer direct 
implications for the economy than the currency‘s exchange rate does. But it is important 
nevertheless. To begin with, the exchange rate and international currency status have al-
ways been causally interrelated notwithstanding some periods such as the early 1990s when 
they have moved in opposite directions for the dollar. But the topic has been made urgent 
by the question of whether international imbalances, specifically the U.S. current account 
deficit and Chinese current account surplus, are sustainable. 
AD V AN T AG E S   O F  H AV I N G   AN   I NT E RN AT I ON AL  CU R RE N CY  
One can think of four advantages to a country of having its currency play a large role in 
the world: 
–  Convenience for the country’s residents. It is certainly more convenient for a country‘s 
exporters, importers, borrowers and lenders to be able to deal in its own currency than 
foreign currencies. Doing so reduces transactions costs as well as foreign exchange risk.
2 
The global use of the dollar, as with the global use of the English language, is a natural 
advantage that American businessmen tend to take for granted. 
–  More business for the country’s banks and other financial institutions. There need be no 
firm connection between the currency in which banking is conducted and the nationality 
of the banks, or between the nationalities of savers and borrowers and the nationality of 
the  intermediating  bank.  Nevertheless,  it  stands  to  reason  that  U.S.  banks  have  a 
comparative advantage at dealing in dollars, British banks at dealing in pounds, Chinese 
banks at dealing in renminbi, and so on. –  Seigniorage. This is perhaps the most well-known advantage of having other countries 
hold one‘s currency. They must give up real goods and services, or ownership of the real 
capital stock, in order to add to the dollars that they use. We are not necessarily talking 
about Seigniorage narrowly defined (foreign holdings of U.S. currency, which doesn‘t 
pay interest). More important is the U.S. ability to run up huge debts denominated in its 
own currency at low interest rates. The United States has consistently earned more on it 
investments overseas than it has had to pay on its debts, a differential of about 1 percent 
per annum.
3 Possibly this American role as the world‘s banker (taking short-term liquid 
deposits and lending long term in riskier higher-return assets) would survive the loss of 
the dollar as the leading international currency. But it seems possible that the loss of one 
would lead to the loss of the other. 
–  Political  power  and  prestige.  Britain‘s  gradual  loss  of  key  currency  status  was 
simultaneous with its gradual loss of political and military preeminence.   A run on the 
pound played an important role in the Suez crisis of 1956, for example, when Britain was 
forced under US pressure to abandon what was left of its imperial designs.
4 
D I S AD V AN T AG E S  O F   H AV I N G   AN  I NT E RN AT I O N AL   CU RRE N CY  
One can think of three disadvantages from the viewpoint of a key currency country. 
They explain why Japan and Germany were in the past reluctant to have their currencies 
held and used widely, and why China worries about the implications of beginning to inter-
nationalize its currency. 
 
–  Larger fluctuations in demand for the currency. It is not automatically clear that having 
one‘s currency held by a wide variety of people around the world would result in greater 
variability of demand. Such instability is probably more likely to follow from an increase 
in the degree of capital mobility, than from key currency status per se. Nevertheless, the 
two are related. Central banks are sometimes concerned that internationalization will 
make it more difficult to control the money stock. This problem need not arise if they do 
not intervene in the foreign exchange market. But the central bank may view letting 
fluctuations in demand for the currency be reflected in the exchange rate as being just as 
undesirable as letting them be reflected in the money supply. 
–  An  increase  in  the  average  demand  for  the  currency.  This  is  the  other  side  of 
Seigniorage.  In  the  1960s  and  1970s,  the  Japanese  and  German  governments  were 
particularly worried about the possibility that if assets were made available to foreign 
residents,  an  inflow  of  capital  would  cause  the  currency  to  appreciate  and  render 
exporters less competitive on world markets. Again, this is also China‘s problem today. 
–  Burden  of  responsibility.  The  monetary  authorities  in  the  country  of  a  leading 
international currency may be called on to take into account the effects of their actions 
on world markets, rather than being free to devote monetary policy solely to domestic 
objectives. The Federal Reserve probably cut interest rates more than it otherwise would 
have in the second half of 1982, and again in late 1998, in response to international debt 
problems in Latin America and elsewhere. At times, Argentina or others have considered officially dollarizing; reluctance to accept any burden of responsibility,  even if only 
implicit, explains the lack of enthusiasm from U.S. authorities. 
WHAT DETERMINES WHET HER A CURRENCY IS SUITED  TO 
INTERNATIONAL STATUS? 
  The literature on what determines reserve currency status is fairly well established. Three 
points are important: 
First  are  fundamental  determinants.  A  list  of  country-specific  determining  factors 
follows. The most important is the size of the country or region in which the currency is 
indigenously used, but there are others as well. Second, network externalities or economies 
of scale and scope are important. Each country is more likely to use whatever currency is 
used by others. Thus international currency use is not linear in the determinants. Rather, 
there  may  be  a  tipping  phenomenon:  if  one  currency  were  to  draw  even  and  surpass 
another, the derivative of reserve currency share with respect to its determining variables—
the  change  in  currency  use  corresponding  to  a  given  0.01  increase  in  economic 
fundamentals—would be higher in the vicinity of 50/50 than in the vicinity of zero or in the 
range  when  the  leading  currency  is  unchallenged.  In  that  sense,  the  switch  happens 
rapidly.
5 Third, in the chronological sense, however, it has usually been argued that the 
switch happens slowly. Whatever currency has been used in the past will continue to be 
used in the future. Thus inertia is great. 
 
The  literature  on  international  currencies  has  identified  a  number  of  factors  that 
determine whether a currency is suited for international currency status:
6 
One relates to patterns of output and trade. The currency of a country that has a large 
share in international output, trade, and finance has a big natural advantage. The U.S. 
economy is still the world‘s largest in terms of output and trade. Alarmist fears of the early 
1990s  notwithstanding,  it  was  never  very  likely  that  Japan,  a  country  with  half  the 
population and far less land area or natural resources, would surpass the United States in 
sheer economic size. But the euro is now the home currency to seventeen countries. Their 
combined economic weight is much greater than Germany alone, or Japan, and roughly 
equal to that of the United States.   For  some  measures  of  international  currency  use—
how often a vehicle currency is used in the invoicing and financing of international trade—
other aspects of the pattern of trade may also be relevant. That much of Asia‘s imports are 
oil and other raw materials and that much of its exports go to the western hemisphere, for 
example, helps explain why a disproportionately small share of trade is invoiced in yen or 
renminbi as opposed to dollars. Raw materials still tend heavily to be priced in dollars. 
Whenever  the  dollar  depreciates  for  more  than  a  few  years,  OPEC  starts  discussing 
switching to another currency of denomination. It hasn‘t happened yet. But it could, if the 
dollar‘s primacy in other international roles were seriously challenged. 
A second factor is a country‘s financial markets. To attain international currency status, 
capital and money markets in the home country must be not only open and free of controls, 
but also deep and well-developed. The large  financial marketplaces of  New  York and 
London clearly benefit the dollar and pound relative to the euro and its predecessor the deutschemark,  as  Frankfurt  is  still  less  well-developed.  Tokyo  and  Frankfurt  financial 
markets have changed a lot over the last few decades. But they still lag far behind New 
York and London as financial centers. Meanwhile, Singapore and Hong Kong have gained. 
And Shanghai may be next. 
It is surprisingly difficult to come up with a proxy for size, depth, or development that is 
available for all the financial centers. We have opted to use as our primary measure data on 
foreign  exchange  turnover  in  the  respective  financial  centers:  New  York,  London, 
Frankfurt, Tokyo, Zurich, etc. This measure differs from turnover of the currencies (dollar, 
pound, euro, etc.), a variable that would be much more simultaneous with the international 
currency status that we are trying to explain. It captures, for example, the pre-eminence of 
London, which continues despite the small role of the pound. This measure has the virtue 
of reflecting to some extent all kinds of international financial transactions (both long-term 
and short-term, banking and securities, bonds and equities). Moreover it is possible to patch 
together a data set covering the desired countries and years—though but just barely, and 
with increasing difficulty  as  one  goes back through the 1970s. We  have also tried  an 
alternative proxy for the size of financial centers—the size of the countries‘ stock markets.  
As an alternative to quantity-based measures, bid-ask spreads might capture the efficiency 
and liquidity of various financial markets. 
A third factor is confidence in the value of the currency. Even if a key currency were 
used  only  as  a  unit  of  account,  a  necessary  qualification  would  be  that  its  value  not 
fluctuate erratically. As it is, a key currency is also used as a form in which to hold assets 
(firms hold working balances of the currencies in which they invoice, investors hold bonds 
issued internationally, and central banks hold currency reserves). Here confidence that the 
value of the currency will be stable, and particularly that it will not be inflated away in the 
future, is critical. The monetary authorities in Japan, Germany, and Switzerland, in the 
1970s established a better track record of low inflation than did the United States, which 
helped them attain international currency status. As recently as the 1980s, the mean and 
variance of the inflation rate in the United States were both higher than in those three hard-
currency countries, though lower than in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and many 
other countries.
7 
Given the good U.S. inflation performance since the 1980s, this is no longer such a 
concern. A more important negative for the dollar is the fact that the United States is now a 
large-scale debtor country. Even if the Federal Reserve never succumbs to the temptations 
or pressures to inflate away the U.S. debt, the continuing U.S. current account deficit is 
always a possible source of downward pressure on the dollar. Such fears work to make 
dollars unattractive. 
A fourth factor is network externalities. An international money, like domestic money, 
derives its value because others are using it. It is a classic instance of network externalities. 
They suggest that, even in the long run, measures of international currency use may not be 
linear in the determinants. There may be a tipping phenomenon when one currency passes 
another.  Furthermore,  the  network  externalities  may  produce  inertia.   The  intrinsic 
characteristics of a currency  may be  less important than the path-dependent historical 
equilibrium: There is an inertial bias in favor of using whatever currency has been the 
international currency in the past. The analogy with language is always useful. If one sat down to design an ideal language, 
it would not be English. Nobody would claim that the English language is particularly well-
suited to be the world‘s lingua franca by virtue of its intrinsic beauty, simplicity, or utility. 
It is neither as elegant and euphonious as French, for example, nor as simple and logical in 
spelling  and  grammar  as  Spanish  or  Italian.  Yet  it  is  certainly  the  language  in  which 
citizens of different countries most often converse and do business, and increasingly so. 
One chooses to use a lingua franca, as one chooses a currency, in the belief that it is the one 
that others are most likely to use. 
The implication is that small changes in the determinants will not produce corresponding 
changes in the reserve currency numbers, at least not in the short run. Changes may show 
up only with a long lag. As noted, the pound remained an important international currency 
even after the United Kingdom lost its position as an economic superpower early in the 
century. In the present context, the inertial bias favors the continued central role of the 
dollar.  
Another  aspect  of  the  network  externalities  is  economies  of  scope.  An  individual 
(exporter, importer, borrower, lender, or currency trader) is more likely to use a given 
currency in his or her transactions if everyone else is doing so. If a currency is widely used 
to invoice trade, it is more likely to be used to invoice financial transactions as well. If it is 
more widely used in financial transactions, it is more likely to be a vehicle currency in 
foreign exchange trading. If it is used as a vehicle currency, it is more likely to used as a 
currency to which smaller countries peg. And so forth.  
 
 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
When pondering the prospects for the renminbi to become an international currency, it 
helps  to  look  to  history.    The  remainder  of  the  paper  turns  to  an  examination  of  the 
historical record – first qualitative and then quantitative. 
 During  the  course  of  the  twentieth  century,  three  major  national  currencies  rose  to 
international currency status: the dollar in the first half of the century and the mark and the 
yen over the two decades following the 1971–73 breakup of the Bretton Woods system. 
The three cases differ in many respects, including the terms on which the currencies ended 
the century. But there are some commonalities in the circumstances in which each rose to 
international currency status, which may hold lessons for the renminbi. 
We will consider briefly the internationalizations of the three currencies. One striking 
conclusion  is  that  in  none  of  the  three  did  nationalist  sentiment  initially  push  the 
international  role  for  the  currency.  Typically,  the  public  was  indifferent,  having 
surprisingly little desire to walk the world stage. Businessmen were often outright opposed, 
fearing that a surge in demand for the currency would drive up its foreign exchange value 
and  hurt  their  competitiveness.  The  interests  of  the  financial  sector  did  little  to 
counterbalance the interests of the manufacturing sector. To be sure, some deliberate policy 
steps were taken that facilitated internationalization, but they were mostly pursued by a 
very  small  elite  that  did  not  have  widespread  support  for  its  actions.  Generally,  the 
internationalization occurred as an unplanned side effect of the economic and financial 
expansion of the country in question. We  will  conclude  by  reporting  the  conclusions  of  an  econometric  analysis  of  three 
fundamentals determine whether a currency is suited for international status. The first is the 
size of the home economy, as measured by GDP or trade. The second is confidence in the 
value  of  the  currency,  as  measured  by  the  long-term  trend  in  its  exchange  rate,  the 
variability of the exchange rate, the country‘s long-term inflation rate, and its position as an 
international net creditor. The third is the development of its financial markets, particularly 
depth, liquidity, dependability and openness.  
A fourth question is more controversial: when the fundamental strengths of one currency 
come to surpass those of others, does the international role of the rising currency evolve 
quickly (perhaps accelerated by a tipping phenomenon) or only slowly (gradual adjustment 
due to inertia)?
 8 
 
The Rapid Ascent of the Dollar after 1913 
 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, Victoria still reigned as Queen and the pound ster-
ling still reigned as supreme currency. Historians estimate, for example, that roughly 60 
percent of the world‘s trade was invoiced in sterling in the late nineteenth century.
9 In 
1899, the share of pounds in known foreign exchange holdings of official institutions was 
almost two-thirds, more than twice the total of the next nearest competitors, the French 
franc and German mark.
10 The dollar did not even make the running.
 
The ranking of the four currencies remained the same in 1913. By 1917, however, the 
dollar had emerged as a major international currency. Foreign central banks had begun to 
hold dollar reserves and the currency was increasingly used in trade and finance. Historians 
debate whether the dollar dethroned the pound soon thereafter, in the 1920s, or whether it 
merely joined the list of major international currencies at that point. Either way, the dollar‘s 
rise as an international currency after 1913 was rapid. What explains this shift? 
Prior  to  1913,  the  dollar‘s  main  problem  was  not  size  (the  first  criterion  for  an 
international  currency):  the  U.S.  economy  had  surpassed  the  UK  economy,  at  least  as 
measured by national output, in 1872.
11 Rather, the country lacked financial markets that 
were deep, liquid, dependable and open. Indeed, it even lacked a central bank, which is 
considered a prerequisite for the development of markets in instruments such as bankers‘ 
acceptances. Perhaps the dollar also fell short in terms of foreign confidence in its value. 
For one thing, the United States was still an international debtor. For another, it had a habit 
of experiencing occasional financial crashes. Indeed the Panic of 1907, which came with a 
50 percent fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and an 11 percent fall in production, 
ended only when J. Pierpont Morgan famously locked Wall Street‘s leaders into his study 
and  refused  to  release  them  until  they  pledged  to  stand  behind  its  teetering  financial 
institutions. With the lender of last resort function dependent on the actions of a private 
citizen, international investors had reason to doubt the dollar‘s future reliability. 
Because Morgan would not always be around to play this role, the episode demonstrated 
the need for a central bank to act as lender of last resort. Senator Nelson Aldrich, having 
become persuaded of this need, convened a meeting of six ―duck hunters‖ on Jekyll Island 
in 1910. The meeting was chaired by financier Paul Warburg and attended by a small group of banking executives, including Benjamin Strong (head of Bankers Trust, representing 
Morgan).
12 They produced the Aldrich Plan, which eventually became the law establishing 
the Federal Reserve.  
There is no question that this was a small elite taking steps that did not have broad 
support. Attempts to found a national bank earlier in American history had foundered on 
populist suspicion of Eastern banking interests, and this attempt would have met the same 
fate had the public known the circumstances of its genesis. But the six conspirators acted in 
extreme secrecy during their supposed duck hunting t rip on Jekyll Island, and kept the 
secret for three years. Despite their precautions, and a proposed organizational structure 
deliberately designed to disperse control beyond an Eastern banking establishment, populist 
opposition to the foundation of the Federal Reserve was strong. The bill passed only in 
1913 when a new president, Woodrow Wilson, decided to take ownership of it.  
Once the central bank was established, the United States made rapid progress in terms of 
the  third  criterion  for  an  international  currency,  increasing  the  depth,  liquidity ,  and 
openness  of  U.S.  financial  markets.  Eichengreen   (2011a)  argues  that  it  was  the 
establishment of a market in dollar -denominated trade acceptances among banks that 
mattered most. As the financial markets develop ed, so did the international role of the 
dollar. The onset of World War I accelerated the transformation:  large-scale wartime 
lending by the United States to Britain and other combatants reversed the nineteenth -
century creditor-debtor relationship, and positioned the dollar as a strong currency—the 
second criterion for international status. 
All this happened without desire, whether on the part of the public or politicians, for 
international prestige or power on the world stage. The law creating the Fed squeezed 
through  Congress  because  of  the  shock  of  the  financial  panic  of  1907,  not  because 
Congress aspired to boost the dollar‘s international standing. Indeed, there is plenty of 
evidence that, even though the world was now ready for a new hegemon and the United 
States had the heft to play that role, it did not have the awareness, interest, or skills to do so. 
The failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the League of Nations in 1919, the passage of the 
Smoot-Hawley  tariff  in  1930,  and  Roosevelt‘s  torpedoing  of  the  London  Economic 
Conference in 1933 are but three examples of U.S. reticence. According to the hegemonic 
stability  theory  of  Kindleberger  (1973),  the  resultant  lack  of  global  leadership  and 
deficiency in the provision of international ―public goods‖ had dire consequences for all 
countries.  The international monetary system in  the interwar period  was  likened to  an 
orchestra without a conductor. 
One would expect that the internationalization of the dollar was in the interest of the 
business community, or at least the New York financial community. But even here, the 
majority  was  not  sufficiently  interested  to  lobby  for  deliberate  measures.  Rather, 
internationalization of the dollar was an important part of the vision held by the same tiny 
elite who conspired to establish the Federal Reserve. Broz (1999, p.31) argues, ―Although 
financial reform was couched in terms of the national interest, Warburg explicitly tied it to 
improving the international position of the dollar.‖ Karmin (2008, p. 116) concludes, ―for 
the plotters on Jekyll Island, the ulterior motive was to profit from the internationalization 
of  the  dollar.‖  The  outsized  influence  of  the  six  duck  hunters  did  not  end  with  the 
establishment of the central bank in 1913. One of them, Benjamin Strong, became the first president of the New York Fed in 1914 and served until his death in 1928. It was he, far 
more than anyone else, who built up the new institution and nurtured the new international 
currency in the 1920s,
13 for example promoting American lending to Europe.
14 Another of 
the six, Frank Vanderlip, president of the bank that was to become Citi, led the way in 
opening international branches and expanding dollar lending.
15 
Regarding the speed of the dollar‘s ascent, the traditional view has been that the dollar 
did not fully supplant the pound until after World War II and that this illustrates the strong 
inertia in international currency roles and the long lags in responding to changes in the 
fundamental determinants. Krugman (1984) put the lag at half a century. The inertia is said 
to result from the network externalities that are intrinsic to the choice of money just as they 
are in the choice of language.  One decides to use the dollar for the same reason that one 
decides to learn English: everyone else has done it.
16 
The pound made a bit of a comeback in the late 1930s.  As late as 1940, the level of 
foreign-owned liquid assets held in sterling was still double that held in dollars.  But by 
1945, the position of the dollar and pound, as measured by this stati stic, had precisely 
reversed.
17 The dollar emerged from the war still convertible into gold, but the pound (and 
other currencies) did not. So the dollar standard became the de facto basis of the Bretton 
Woods system. Some have placed the date of the pound‘s dethronement as late as 1954, 
based on figures of foreign exchange reserve holdings.
18 That could conceivably imply a 
lag behind fundamentals as long as eighty years, if one viewed the main determining event 
as U.S. GNP passing that of the UK in 1872. 
A more reasonable view is that the dethronement took place earlier than 1954 and the 
change in overall fundamentals took place later than 1872, during World War I. This is 
when the United States attained the other criteria needed for an international currency: a 
central bank, net creditor status, liquid and open financial markets, and  is  also when 
sterling lost its convertibility into gold (the first time) as well as most of its creditor 
position.
19  If the fundamentals are judged to have switched in 1917, and th e currency 
positions to have finally switched in 1945, then the lag was on the order of  thirty years. 
Others have recently argued that the lag was shorter still. They say that the reserve 
holding figures are distorted by Britain ‘s  insistence  that  Commonwealth  countries  be 
required to hold pounds and be discouraged from spending them on other countries‘ goods. 
Eichengreen  points  to  the  formation  of  the  sterling  bloc  in  the  1930s  and  offers  the 
following evidence that the constraint continued to bind after the war: in 1947, when the 
UK  removed  restrictions  on  use  of  sterling  (as  it  had  agreed  to  do,  under  relentless 
American pressure), Commonwealth countries rushed to sell pounds for dollars, impelling 
the UK to restore the restrictions.
20 
Eichengreen (2011a); Eichengreen and Flandreau (2008, 2010); Subramanian (2011a, b) 
argue that the dollar overtook the pound as early as the mid-1920s.  The implication is that 
the lag in this episode was less than ten years. Eichengreen (2011a, p. 32) writes, ―From a 
standing start in 1914, the dollar had already overtaken sterling by 1925.‖
21 
Indeed, if one judges economic size not by GDP but by trade volume (Figure 1), then the 
implication is that the lag was even shorter. The level of U.S. exports first surpassed UK 
exports during World War I. The difference was very small throughout the 1920s and 
1930s. Not until World War II did U.S. trade pull definitively ahead of UK trade. Either way, the argument is that the transition in currency status was actually rather sudden, and 
that the dollar could fall from grace just as quickly today.
22 
 
Figure 1. U.S. and UK exports, 1900–57 
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The Brief Ascent of the Deutsche Mark after 1973 
 
The Deutsche mark attained such a high degree of confidence and prestige in the latter 
part of the twentieth century that it is easy to forget how short was its life. It was born in 
Ludwig Erhard‘s currency reform of 1948, replacing the Reichsmark (which itself had been 
created in 1924, in the aftermath of the German hyperinflation of 1921–23). The Bundes-
bank was not founded until 1957. 
  By 1958, the period of dollar shortage
23 had ended and European currencies restored 
convertibility.
24 Almost immediately, a rising U.S. balance of payments deficit and declin-
ing ratio of U.S. gold reserves to dollar liabilities brought into question the long-term pros-
pects for the dollar. This was the dilemma that Triffin (1960) had predicted. But the trend 
was greatly accelerated by the  U.S. government‘s Vietnam-era spending, which was not 
matched by a willingness to raise taxes to pay for it, but rather accompanied by monetary 
expansion and inflation. The second criterion for the dollar‘s international status—its long-
term credibility as a store of value—was put in doubt. 
  The American response to this challenge revealed, again, how currency internationaliza-
tion tends to come fairly low down a country‘s priority list. U.S. government policy sought 
to protect the balance of payments, but not the internationalization of the dollar. The Trea-
sury instituted capital controls such as the Interest Equalization Tax. The controls together 
with financial repression in the banking system (reserve requirements and Regulation Q‘s 
ceiling on the interest rate that banks were allowed to pay their depositors) resulted in the 
relocation of banking business offshore, beginning with the Eurodollar market in London.
25 
President Richard Nixon took the dollar entirely off gold in 1971 and the fixed exchange 
rate system definitively ended in 1973. U.S. inflation and depreciation further impaired the 
international attractiveness of the dollar as a store of value. The United States was seen to 
be neglecting its responsibility to provide the ―public good‖ of a stable anchor for the world 
monetary system.
26 The depreciation of the dollar was concentrated particularly in four major episodes, one per decade:  1977–79,  1985–88,  1993–95, and  2002–2008. In each 
episode the dollar exchange rate became an issue of conflict between the United States and 
its trading partners, Europe in particular. American treasury secretaries were periodically 
faulted for a policy of benign neglect of the dollar‘s value. Presumably as a result, the share 
of dollars in international reserves began a long-term decline after 1977 (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of the Dollar in Foreign Exchange Reserve Holdings, 1965–2010 
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Source: Menzie Chinn (The first series is a spliced version of updated 2003 data obtained July 2004, for 1980 onward, to 
an unpublished data set for 1965-2001. The later series, data from the IMF‘s Currency Composition of Official Foreign 
Exchange Reserves, assigns a share of the unallocated residual to U.S. dollars.) 
 
Two newly international currencies, the mark and the yen, began to gain share at the 
expense of the newly declining dollar and the still declining pound. (See Figure 3.)  But, 
mirroring U.S. attitudes toward the internationalization of the dollar, the German attitude 
toward the mark involved little eagerness to internationalize it. German policy was in fact 
opposed to internationalization.
27 In terms of foreign policy, there was an aversion  to the 
idea of strutting the world stage. Domestically, the economically and politically powerful 
manufacturing sector feared that internationalization would lead to upsurges in the demand 
for marks, which would result in either further appreciation, if the currency was allowed to 
float, or in monetary inflows, if the Bundesbank bought up dollars to resist the change in 
the exchange rate.  In the former case, appreciation would immediately hurt exporters ‘ 
international competitiveness. In the latter case, the same loss of price competitiveness 
would eventually come, but via the even-less-welcome channel of inflation. 
Frieden (2000) has drawn a distinction between the financial sector, which supports a 
strong currency, and the manufacturing sector that does not. In colloquial American terms, 
it  is  Wall  Street  versus  Main  Street.  One  can  see  the  banking  sector  weighing  in,  in 
countries where it is large and powerful: the United Kingdom and Switzerland. But the financial sector is probably too small, relative to manufacturing, to carry much weight in 
Germany (or, for that matter, in France or Japan). 
Nevertheless, the mark continued to gain status throughout the 1980s. The trend took 
place not because of policy, but in spite of it. It was a side effect of the growing size of the 
German economy (especially trade) and the impeccable reputation that the Bundesbank had 
established for keeping the mark strong in value, whether measured by inflation or the 
exchange rate. By the foreign exchange reserve measure, the currency share reached almost 
20 percent in 1989.
28 
  That year turns out to have been the peak in the mark‘s share. Slow economic growth 
may  have  been  a  contributing  reason  why  the  mark‘s  share  of  international  reserves 
stopped rising in the 1990s. Another is that the United States won the Cold War in 1989–91 
and began seriously to put its house in order in the mid-1990s, as reflected in the length and 
strength of that decade‘s noninflationary economic expansion, the steady elimination of 
troublesome budget deficits, and the appreciation of the dollar in the second half of the 
decade. 
More importantly, Germany spent the decade preparing euthanasia for its beloved cur-
rency. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 came to fruition in January 1999 when the mark, to-
gether with the French franc and nine other continental currencies, went out of existence in 
the historic creation of the euro. German acquiescence was the ultimate expression of the 
absence of craving for the political prestige or economic power that an international cur-
rency might bring.
 The motives on Germany‘s part included a desire to assure its neighbors 
that they had nothing to fear from the even larger country that had been created by German 
reunification in 1991. But this is just another illustration of the weakness of nationalistic 
forces. 
As a footnote, the euro is a partial exception to the general phenomenon described in this 
paper.  The  motives  for  its  creation  were  thoroughly  political,  the  ambition  to  acquire 
international status baked into it from the beginning.
29 In realizing this ambition, the euro 
started with two advantages—that it was the home currency for a bloc that resembled the 
United  States  in  terms  of  economic  weight,  and  that  it  seemed  likely  to  inherit  the 
credibility of the mark. As a result, the euro in its first decade advanced quickly into the 
ranks  of  the  top  reserve  currencies.  Since  2010,  sovereign  debt  worries  have  severely 
dented reasonable expectations of the euro‘s future. But if the authorities were to respond 
to the crisis by creating a Eurobond, that would—once again as a side effect—give a big 
new boost to the fundamentals underpinning its role as an international reserve currency. 
 
 
The Brief Ascent of the Yen after 1984 
 
The period of internationalization of the yen can be divided into halves. The first period 
was the 1980s, when international use of the yen trended upward even though domestic 
politics was opposed to internationalization and government policy was at best neutral 
toward it. The Japanese feared that increased demand for their money would hurt export 
competitiveness, just as the Germans did. In the subsequent period, policy sought actively to promote internationalization. But it was too late: economic fundamentals had already 
turned around, dominated by the shrinking economy.  
After World War II, Japan‘s export-driven economic miracle allowed its currency to 
meet the first criterion for internationalization: the country‘s weight, both in terms of its 
share of global GDP and in terms of share of global trade, grew rapidly. But it was slower 
to meet the other criteria. Only during the period 1960–73 did the government begin to 
allow foreigners to acquire some types of assets in Japan. Only in 1964 was full current 
account convertibility under the IMF Articles of Agreement restored.
30 
After the breakup of the Bretton Woods system ( 1971–73), central banks around the 
world began gradually to hold some yen as foreign exchange reserves, especially as the 
Bank of Japan began to establish a reputation for a currency that strengthened in value. But 
other measures of internationalization, such as use of the currency in invoicing trade or 
denominating debt, continued to show a very low share for the yen. (In 1979, only 25 
percent of Japanese exports and 2 percent of imports were denominated in yen.) This is not 
surprising:  Japanese  financial  markets  remained  uncompetitive,  highly  regulated,  and 
mostly closed to foreigners. The monetary authorities intervened to prevent the yen from 
appreciating  in  1976  and  1977,  another  sign  that  the  internationalization  of  the  yen 
mattered less than the interests of Japan‘s exporters.
31 
In 1979–80, the government began to allow foreign residents to hold a fuller range of 
domestic  assets).  But  politics  and  policy  continued  to  oppose  internationalization.  The 
Foreign Exchange Law of 1980 still allowed ―minimum necessary controls‖ on capital 
flows to manage the exchange rate or balance of payments. When further liberalization 
came, gaiatsu—foreign pressure from the United States—was the main driving force. Six 
months of negotiations between the two countries produced the Yen/Dollar Agreement in 
1984. The main political motive, which had become strong enough to counterbalance the 
fears of domestic manufacturers that they might lose competitiveness, was to satisfy U.S. 
demands, in fear that the alternative of allowing protectionist sentiment to grow in the U.S. 
Congress would  be worse. Support for internationalization  from the Japanese financial 
sector was negligible. This balance of political forces is illustrated by the content of the 
Yen/Dollar  Agreement.  In  addition  to  agreeing  to  the  demands  to  further  lift  capital 
controls and to internationalize the yen, the government also agreed to give more favorable 
treatment to U.S. banks and financial institutions wishing to do business in Japan. It did not 
agree to immediate and complete deregulation of domestic financial markets, however.
32 
The U.S. motive in pushing for internationalization of the yen was a theory that it would 
lead to appreciation and help U.S. exporters. This did not happen at first: U.S. interest rates 
in 1984 were well above those in Japan, so that the removal of remaining capital controls 
allowed an acceleration in the net outflow of capital from Japan rather than the reverse.  The 
sharpest appreciation of the yen came  instead between 1985 and 1987 , and is usually 
associated with the Plaza Accord, in which Japan agreed with the United States and 
Europeans to intervene in foreign exchange markets to push the dollar down.
33 By this 
time, Japan‘s position in international trade was so strong that the insecurity shown by the 
postwar slogan ―export or die‖ had begun to ease. 
Some  in  Asia  today  believe  that  these  American  efforts  to  appreciate  the  yen—the 
Yen/Dollar Agreement and the Plaza Accord—were deliberate attempts to sabotage the Japanese economy and that they were ultimately successful in that aim in the 1990s. This 
conspiracy theory goes one step too far. It is important to recall the three-year episode that 
led to the Japanese crash of the 1990s: the 1987–89 bubbles in Japan‘s stock market and 
real estate market. During the bubble period, the Japanese authorities no longer intervened 
in favor of a strong yen, but if anything sought to prevent the dollar from depreciating 
further.
34  In retrospect,  the Bank of Japan‘s monetary  policy  was too  easy  during this 
period (the same mistake the Fed made in 2005–2006).
35 
International use of the yen continued gradually to rise in the 1980s.
36  Its share of 
foreign exchange reserves reached almost 9 percent in 1991 (Figure 2). That turned out to 
be  the  peak.   Most  commentators,  however,  distracted  by  the  continued  dizzying 
appreciation of the yen against the dollar from 1990 to 1995, failed to notice that the trend 
in the 1990s had shifted back toward rising international use of the dollar.
37 Indeed, it was 
fashionable to pronounce that the United States was in decline as a world power, especially 
relative to Japan,
38 and that the dollar was in decline as an international currency, especially 
relative to the yen.
39 
 
Figure 3: Reserves Held by Central Banks as Shares of Total— Major Currencies, 1973–2010 
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Estimated currency shares of reserves of all central banks, year end, 1965-2003. ―Other currencies‖ omitted. 
Source: IMF, Annual Reports, Chinn and Frankel (2008), Chinn (2012). 
In the 1990s, official policy at last shifted firmly in favor of internationalization, with the 
aims of reducing exchange rate risk for domestic firms, facilitating business for Japanese 
banks and other financial institutions, and promoting Japan as a financial center.
40 The 
prime minister in 1996 announced a comprehensive package of financial liberalization. The 
resulting  ―big  bang‖  of  1998  did  not  live  up  to  its  advance  billing,  however.  Further 
attempts were made to reverse what by now was the decline in the status of Tokyo as one 
of the world‘s top financial centers.
41 This work continued, indeed intensified, into the next decade. But it became progressively more evident that the effort had failed. Indicators 
showed the yen‘s international use was shrinking. The decline was an effect of the ills 
afflicting Japan‘s real economy, which had shown hardly any growth since the bursting of 
the land and equity bubbles at the start of the 1990s. ―By the end of 2003, it was clear that 
any further attempt to internationalise the yen . . . would be futile without a fundamental 
change in the economic might of Japan.‖
42 Although the yen received safe haven capital 
inflows after the global financial crisis of 2008, attained a high in the nominal exchange 
rate in 2011, and remains an international currency that ranks above the Swiss franc and 
roughly as high as pound sterling,
43 its rise as an international currency peaked twenty 
years ago. 
 
 
Statistical Estimation of Adjustment of Reserve Currency Shares to 
Fundamental Determinants 
 
The period during which the mark and the yen rose to true international currency status 
(1975–90), surpassing the pound and Swiss franc for the number 2 and number 3 slots, of-
fers the opportunity to ascertain empirically how quickly foreign exchange reserve holdings 
adjust to economic fundamentals. Shares in central banks‘ foreign exchange reserve hold-
ings are the most important measure of international currency status as well as the most 
easily measured. 
A  number  of  attempts  have  been  made  to  estimate  statistically  the  determinants  of 
reserve shares.
44 The period 1973–98 is just barely long enough to get useful econometric 
estimates  regarding  the  influence  of  the  major  determinants  of  the  shares  of  five 
international currencies (dollar, mark, yen, pound, Swiss franc). It does not include the 
once-in-a-century phenomenon of one currency overthrowing another in the number one 
slot. But it is possible to put together a decent set of consistent data over this period, and 
the twenty-five-year period does neatly include the rise of the mark and yen. 
Estimates reported here use IMF annual data on aggregate central bank holdings of the 
relevant major currencies. The data set ends in 1999, because that is when the mark and 
franc go out of existence.
45 It does not extend further back than 1973 because we need data 
on all three fundamental determinants: not just on country size and confidence, but also on 
the depth of the countries‘ financial markets. We  use the volume of turnover in the foreign 
exchange market as a measure of depth of the countries‘ financial markets, and measure 
confidence in the currency‘s value using trend inflation, trend depreciation, exchange rate 
volatility, and international asset position.
46  
 
  Figure 4 shows foreign exchange turnover (as a share of total) in the countries correspond-
ing to the key reserve currencies.  The size of the London market is impressively large, and 
rising, in contrast to the shares of Frankfurt and Tokyo, which are smaller and declining.  
Figure 4: Foreign exchange turnover in financial center, as a share of total turnover  .0
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Source: BIS, Triennial Central Bank Survey, various issues; Chinn (2012). 
 
A preliminary examination of the relationship between the currency shares and GDP at 
market rates, or GDP in PPP terms, suggests two propositions. First, it does not seem that 
the difference between GDP measured at market rates or in PPP terms is essential for our 
purposes. Second, it is apparent that the relationship between currency shares and GDP 
shares is nonlinear. The curve must turn sharply upward somewhere in the middle. (See 
Figure 5.)  This consideration, and the realization that no currency share can fall below zero 
or rise above 100 percent, leads us to the logistic as the functional form. The standard logis-
tic transformation is symmetric, and has a maximal slope at share = 0.50. When we plot the 
logistic of the currency share against the size variables, a straight line fits the data much 
more comfortably, indicating that the logistic may be a good guess. 
 
Figure 6. Currency Share versus GDP share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chinn and Frankel (2007)  
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Table 2. Panel Regression for Determination of Currency Shares 
 
Dependent variable: logit of currency shares in reserve holdings 
Pre-euro sample (1973–98) 
   
Coefficient estimate 
 
Standard Error 
 
 
Constant  -0.65  [0.15]   
 
GDP ratio  2.77  [0.64]   
 
Inflation differential  -2.64  [1.16]   
Exchange rate variability  -0.98  [0.57]   
FX turnover ratio  0.45   [0.29]   
Lag of logit of shares  0.85   [0.03]   
 
Estimated using OLS.   N = 182.  Adjusted R
2 = 0.97.   Figures in bold face are significant at the 10 % level.  
Notes: Dependent variable is logit, i.e., log (share/(1-share)). All variables are in decimal form. GDP is at market rates. 
 
 
 
The functional form that seems to fit the data well is called a logit. It allows a change in 
fundamentals from 50 percent to 51 percent to have a far bigger effect on currency shares 
than  a  change  from  0  to  1  percent.  This  tipping  phenomenon  is  one  manifestation  of 
network externalities in the choice of an international currency. Table 2 reports the results 
of one equation. The fundamental factors of GDP, the inflation differential, and exchange 
rate variability all appear statistically significant. Foreign exchange turnover is also of the 
hypothesized sign, but is not significant in this particular regression.
47 
  The effect of the lagged reserves variable  is of great interest. In this equation, its 
coefficient is estimated at 0.85. That means that, each year, the currency shares move 15 
percent  of the way toward their long -run equilibrium.  The half-life of the adjustment 
process is four years (0.85 to the  fifth power is 0.5). For concreteness, if one country‘s 
fundamentals, such as size, register a sudden leap from 70 percent of a rival‘s level to 110 
percent, the prediction is that its reserve currency share will reach 90 percent of its rival‘s 
after four years and 100 percent after eight years. (Some other versions of the equation give 
substantially slower speeds of adjustment.) 
 
Table 3 reports further variations of the regression equations reported in Table 2.  The 
estimated effects of size, the inflation differential, and the lagged endogenous variable are 
robust.   The statistical significance of the other measures of rate of return (depreciation and 
exchange rate variability) and of foreign exchange market turnover depends on the precise 
specification. 
 
 Table  3.  Determinants  of  Reserve  Currency  Shares  during  the  Rise  of  the  DM  and  Yen  
 
Panel Regression (1973–1998) 
Dependent variable: logit of share of major currencies in central banks‘ holdings of foreign exchange reserves 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
Constant  -0.506 
[0.123] 
-0.648 
[0.154] 
-0.497 
0.124 
-0.674 
[0.154] 
-0.488 
[0.138] 
-0.487 
[0.138] 
-0.117 
[0.061]   
GDP ratio   2.285  2.768  2.735  3.690  2.215  2.775  1.040 
  [0.564]  [0.643]  [0.781]  [0.923]  [0.616]  [0.854]  [0.288] 
Inflation differential   -1.565  -2.639  -1.512  -2.860       
  [0.927]  [1.156]  [0.930]  [1.164]       
Depreciation           -1.079  -0.920  -1.095 
          [1.294]  [1.306]  [0.594] 
Exchange rate  
variance  -0.445  -0.981  -0.594  -1.395  -0.583  -0.798  -1.251 
  [0.457]  [0.573]  [0.491]  [0.644]  [0.581]  [0.624]  [0.341] 
Forex turnover ratio     0.446    0.576  0.208  0.252  0.427 
    [0.289]    [0.303]  [0.302]  [0.305]  [0.145] 
GDP leader      -0.125  -0.217    -0.150   
      [0.150]  [0.156]    0.159   
Lag log(sh t-1/1- sh t-1)  0.879  0.851  0.882  0.846  0.881  0.882  0.957 
  [0.025]  [0.031]  [0.025]  [.031]  [.029]  [.029]  [.014] 
N  182  182  182  182  182  182  156 
Sample period  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98  73-98 
Adjusted R2  0.97  0.97  0.97   0.97   0.97   0.97   0.99  
 
Notes: Dependent variable: log(sh/(1-sh)), All variables are in decimal form. GDP at market terms. Estimated using OLS. 
Figures in bold face are significant at the 10 percent level. Column [7] omits Japanese yen and estimates using cross-
section weighted standard errors. 
 
 
  Subramanian  (2011a,  b)  pursues  a  similar  econometric  approach,  but  extends  the 
reserve data back to 1900, with a gap between 1929 and 1958.  The advantage is that the 
sample spans the period when the dollar overtook the pound. The disadvantage is that he 
has to omit any measure of the depth of financial markets or of the rate of return. He finds 
that size (which in his case is trade) is a very powerful predictor, and he also finds a role for 
countries‘ net creditor status (significant at the 10 percent level). 
What are the prospects for China‘s yuan and the currencies of the other ―BRIC‖ emerg-
ing market economies, Brazil, Russia, and India?
48  Figure 6 shows the IMF‘s forecasted 
2017 GDP levels for the four emerging market economies, along with the United States 
and the UK.  Figure 6: GDP (billions of USD) for US, UK, Brazil, Russia, India and China, evaluated at market exchange rates.  
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Source: Chinn (2012) and World Economic Outlook (April 2012) database. 
Forecast data 2011 onward (except US and UK: 2012 onward).  
 
All four emerging market economies will not exceed US GDP (at market exchange 
rates) in the next five years, but China‘s GDP surpassed UK GDP in 2005 and Japan‘s 
GDP in 2009. Brazilian GDP is currently approximately on par with that of the UK.  By 
2017, Russia and India are projected to have matched the UK as well. 
 
Figure 7: De jure financial openness index (Chinn-Ito KAOPEN). 
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Higher values denote higher financial openness.    Source: Chinn (2012). 
 
Figure 7 plots the Chinn-Ito (2008) financial openness indicators, KAOPEN. This index 
is the first principal component of binary measures pertaining to restrictions on current ac-
count and capital account transactions, as well as the requirement for surrender of export 
proceeds and the existence of dual exchange rates.
49 The figure highlights the fact that, ac-
cording to the rules and regulations reported to the IMF, China and India lag far behind 
Russia and Brazil in terms of financial openness, which in turn lag far behind the US and 
UK, as one would expect.   
Conclusions 
 
What lessons can we draw from the experience of the past century? What lessons, in par-
ticular, can be drawn for the international currency prospects of the latest contender, the 
renminbi?
50 
Could China‘s currency now be in the same position as the U.S. dollar at the time of 
World War I, poised to make a rapid ascent and even rival the position of the historical 
leader? This is what Subramanian (2011a, b) concludes, enthusing that the renminbi might 
overtake the dollar around 2022. Such analyses are based on the calculation that at current 
rates of growth, the Chinese economy may overtake the U.S. economy within a decade, 
even by the GDP criterion for size, let alone by the trade criterion.
51 Another determinant 
consistent with this conclusion is the prospective rate of return: everyone expects the RMB 
to appreciate against the dollar in the long run.
52 China is a creditor and is still running 
large surpluses while the U.S. is a debtor and is still running large deficits. 
But the third criterion for international currency status is conspicuously missing: deep, 
liquid, open capital markets. 
On the one hand,  the last few years have seen a number of substan tive steps toward 
liberalization of currency:  
–  Chinese firms have begun over the last two years to use the RMB in international trade. 
–  Foreign central banks have been able to hold RMB since August 2010. (Malaysia‘s went 
first, buying RMB bonds for its FX reserves, in September 2010.) 
–  A ―dim sum‖ market has been now developing in Hong Kong. Between 2007 and 2010, 
RMB  62  billion  of  RMB  bonds  (27  batches)  were  issued  offshore  including  by 
McDonald‘s.  The  Bank  of  China  Hong  Kong  launched  an  RMB  bond  index  on 
December 31, 2010. 
–  In November 2010, RMB deposits in Hong Kong reached RMB 280 b. 
–  In June 2012 the authorities revealed that Chinese firms in Shenzhen will be allowed to 
borrow RMB from Hong Kong banks (echoing Shenzhen‘s designation 32 years ago as 
the first special economic zone for international trade and investment).
53 
 
On the other hand, however: 
–  China‘s financial markets are still not very open, as Figure 7 illustrates. 
–  Cross-border capital flows remain subject to heavy controls. Foreign companies still 
cannot borrow in mainland China. 
–  RMB bonds and deposits in Hong Kong are only small as a fraction of total RMB bonds 
and deposits (and of course Hong Kong is in any case part of China). 
–  Development of China‘s domestic financial market has just begun. 
–  It is still very highly regulated; the domestic system is ―financially repressed.‖ 
 
In short, by the criteria of liquidity, breadth, and openness, Chinese financial markets 
still have a long way to go before they catch up with those of other major currencies. For 
this  reason,  the  renminbi  in  2010–2011  has  only  just  begun  to  act  as  an  international 
currency.   For example, by 2011, China‘s currency had climbed in the rankings only to number 21 when measured by the currency composition of international debt (behind the 
South African rand, (up from 15, behind the Russia rouble, in 2001-05; Appendix 3)   It 
had  climbed  to  number  17  in  foreign  exchange  market  turnover  (behind  the  Russian 
rouble).   And so on. 
The government in Beijing since 2010 has deliberately pursued offshore international 
use of the currency.  In  principle, it  could accelerate the  financial  market development 
necessary to realize this goal. But if it were to do that, it would be acting contrary to the 
three precedents examined here, the dollar, mark, and yen. Moreover, it would be doing so 
despite  the  tremendous  importance  of  its  manufacturing  sector  relative  to  its  financial 
sector, which would make one expect a reluctance to internationalize the currency, for the 
same competitiveness reasons as in the earlier cases. As Subramanian admits, ―For China, 
therefore, there is a tension between the export-led growth strategy, which requires denying 
foreigners the ability to buy Chinese assets, and promoting reserve currency status, which 
requires unrestricted access to foreigners to buy Chinese assets.‖
54 
Not  only  does  China‘s  announced  policy  defy  the  logic  of  political  economy.  The 
country‘s sequencing of its reforms also appears unorthodox. China is encouraging the use 
of the RMB outside its borders, not having yet begun to remove its controls on capital 
inflows or outflows and barely having begun to liberalize domestic financial markets. This 
is not the usual pattern. McCauley notes, ―One cannot find any precedent for the effort of 
the Chinese authorities to develop an offshore market while keeping in place extensive 
controls on the cross-border flows of capital. No other country has set out to develop an 
offshore market.‖
55 
What is China up to? One can only speculate. But several hypotheses are possible. The 
first is that the country seeks the advantages of international currency status—Seigniorage, 
convenience for its firms, and international prestige (often seen to be among the trappings 
appropriate  for  a  newly  arrived  economic  powerhouse)—and  that  it  puts  even  higher 
priority on these goals than on continuing the export-led development strategy that it has 
been following until now. The second hypothesis is that it does not fully realize the tension 
between the goal of internationalization and the goal of keeping the currency competitively 
valued,  and  that  the  offshore  strategy  is  evidence  that  it  thinks  it  can  pursue  both 
simultaneously. A third hypothesis is that the internationalization strategy is the work of an 
elite few—the Chinese counterparts to the duck hunters of Jekyll Island. This elite might be 
motivated by the worry that the export led strategy has finally run into limits, especially 
inflation and a housing bubble. It might recognize the importance of shifting the economy 
from exports to the domestic sector, and might see financial opening, the easing of financial 
repression,  and  RMB  appreciation,  as  contributing  to  that  strategy.
56  It  might  feel 
politically  constrained  to  try  out  internationalization  in  limited  geographical  areas, 
beginning with  Hong Kong, followed by Shenzhen, and so on, much as the Special 
Economic  Zones  30  years  ago  demonstrated  the  success  of  trade  opening  before 
liberalization was extended more widely.   
These three hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive: the elite few could be 
appealing to the advantages of international currency status as a way of overcoming the 
competitiveness fears of others. Hong Kong is an eager participant. But if China is not yet ready to liberalize its domestic financial markets, to legalize capital inflows, or to let the 
currency appreciate, then full internationalization is probably a long way off. 
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  Appendix: Measures of International Use of the RMB and Other Currencies 
 
Table A1. International Debt Securities—Currency Composition, 2001–2011 1/ 2/ 
Top 25 Currencies 3/ 
Euro 4,818.9 42.2 11,210.0 46.9 12,820.8 47.5 12,173.6 44.0 13,119.9 45.2
US dollar 4,703.3 41.2 8,752.8 36.6 9,745.2 36.1 10,843.7 39.2 11,128.9 38.3
Pound sterling 866.2 7.6 1,950.3 8.2 2,241.4 8.3 2,214.9 8.0 2,275.7 7.8
Japanese yen 487.4 4.3 675.9 2.8 710.8 2.6 782.2 2.8 762.1 2.6
Swiss franc 198.9 1.7 352.1 1.5 386.4 1.4 416.2 1.5 430.3 1.5
Canadian dollar 89.4 0.8 271.0 1.1 307.7 1.1 354.1 1.3 369.2 1.3
Australian dollar 92.9 0.8 253.2 1.1 276.5 1.0 335.6 1.2 350.9 1.2
Hong Kong dollar 53.6 0.5 76.3 0.3 70.1 0.3 69.1 0.2 69.4 0.2
Swedish krona 17.1 0.1 60.8 0.3 70.9 0.3 94.6 0.3 104.9 0.4
New Zealand dollar 16.6 0.1 45.7 0.2 44.3 0.2 38.9 0.1 37.2 0.1
Norwegian krone 19.1 0.2 41.1 0.2 54.5 0.2 65.1 0.2 75.0 0.3
South African rand 10.7 0.1 32.3 0.1 37.9 0.1 35.8 0.1 35.5 0.1
Singapore dollar 11.0 0.1 29.8 0.1 31.1 0.1 35.7 0.1 37.3 0.1
Brazilian real 1.2 0.0 22.8 0.1 24.6 0.1 35.8 0.1 40.8 0.1
Mexican peso 1.1 0.0 17.5 0.1 16.7 0.1 19.7 0.1 20.3 0.1
Czech koruna 7.5 0.1 17.3 0.1 18.4 0.1 15.0 0.1 16.1 0.1
New Turkish lira 1.3 0.0 16.2 0.1 16.6 0.1 19.7 0.1 19.7 0.1
Polish zloty 5.6 0.0 13.3 0.1 14.5 0.1 14.9 0.1 14.6 0.1
UAE dirham 0.0 0.0 12.2 0.1 19.6 0.1 19.7 0.1 20.4 0.1
Russian rouble 0.4 0.0 11.7 0.0 14.4 0.1 16.1 0.1 19.9 0.1
Renminbi 0.3 0.0 10.4 0.0 14.3 0.1 19.3 0.1 25.4 0.1
Danish krone 7.3 0.1 6.9 0.0 5.4 0.0 4.5 0.0 3.8 0.0
Icelandic króna 1.4 0.0 6.2 0.0 3.1 0.0 2.8 0.0 2.8 0.0
Malaysian ringgit 0.2 0.0 3.9 0.0 4.9 0.0 6.8 0.0 7.1 0.0
Colombian peso 0.4 0.0 3.8 0.0 4.2 0.0 5.4 0.0 6.6 0.0
Other currencies 10.6 0.1 24.1 0.1 25.2 0.1 34.5 0.1 37.6 0.1
Total 11,422.3 100.0 23,917.6 100.0 26,979.3 100.0 27,673.7 100.0 29,031.1 100.0
Currency
Levels  Shares Levels  Shares Levels  Shares
Average 2001 - 2005 Average 2006 - 2010 2011 Q1 2009
Levels  Shares
2010
Levels  Shares
 
Source: BIS International Debt Securities Statistics, Tables 13A and 13B 
 
1/ It includes international bonds and notes plus international money market instruments. 
2/ Levels in billions of US dollars; shares in percent of total. 
3/ Currency ranking is based on average 2006 - 2010.  
Table A2. Global Foreign Exchange Market Turnover—Currency Composition 1/2/ 
US dollar 556.7 44.9 851.0 44.0 1,493.5 44.9 1,689.0 42.4
Euro 234.9 19.0 361.8 18.7 630.1 19.0 777.6 19.5
Japanese yen 145.8 11.8 201.4 10.4 391.1 11.8 377.7 9.5
Pound sterling 80.8 6.5 159.5 8.2 216.8 6.5 256.3 6.4
Australian dollar 26.8 2.2 58.2 3.0 71.9 2.2 150.9 3.8
Swiss franc 37.0 3.0 58.3 3.0 99.4 3.0 126.7 3.2
Canadian dollar 27.8 2.2 40.6 2.1 74.6 2.2 105.1 2.6
Hong Kong dollar 13.9 1.1 17.0 0.9 37.2 1.1 47.0 1.2
Swedish krona 15.5 1.2 21.2 1.1 41.5 1.2 43.6 1.1
New Zealand dollar 3.4 0.3 10.3 0.5 9.2 0.3 31.7 0.8
Korean won 5.0 0.4 11.0 0.6 13.4 0.4 30.1 0.8
Singapore dollar 6.5 0.5 8.8 0.5 17.5 0.5 28.2 0.7
Norwegian krone 9.0 0.7 13.3 0.7 24.2 0.7 26.3 0.7
Mexican peso 5.1 0.4 10.7 0.6 13.8 0.4 25.0 0.6
Indian rupee 1.4 0.1 3.1 0.2 3.8 0.1 18.9 0.5
Russian rouble 2.1 0.2 6.1 0.3 5.7 0.2 17.9 0.5
Chinese renminbi 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 17.1 0.4
Polish zloty 2.8 0.2 3.6 0.2 7.5 0.2 16.0 0.4
Turkish new lira 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 14.6 0.4
South African rand 5.8 0.5 7.0 0.4 15.7 0.5 14.4 0.4
Brazilian real 2.9 0.2 2.6 0.1 7.9 0.2 13.6 0.3
Danish krone 7.4 0.6 8.4 0.4 19.8 0.6 11.3 0.3
Hungarian forint 0.1 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.3 0.0 8.6 0.2
Malaysian ringgit 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.2 0.0 5.5 0.1
Thai baht 0.9 0.1 1.9 0.1 2.5 0.1 3.8 0.1
Other  Currencies 46.4 3.7 73.7 3.8 136.9 3.7 124.0 3.1
All currencies 1,239 100 1,934 100 3,324 100 3,981 100
Currency
2010
Levels  Shares
2007
Levels  Shares
2001
Levels  Shares
2004
Levels  Shares
 
Source: Bank of International Settlements, 2010 Triennial Central Bank Survey; IMF calculations. 
 
1/ Levels in billions of US dollars; shares in percentage of average daily turnover in April of each year.  
2/ Currency ranking based on average turnover for 2010. Table A3. Global Foreign Exchange Derivatives Market Turnover— 
Currency Composition, 2010 1/ 2/ 
US dollar 195.9 41.4 800.6 45.4 18.6 42.4 79.4 38.3 1094.5 44.0
Euro 74.6 15.8 304.8 17.3 8.6 19.5 43.5 21.0 431.6 17.3
Japanese yen 57.4 12.1 139.4 7.9 3.4 7.8 27.2 13.1 227.4 9.1
Pound sterling 27.4 5.8 111.2 6.3 1.3 2.9 10.0 4.8 149.9 6.0
Australian dollar 14.5 3.1 70.5 4.0 2.9 6.5 7.7 3.7 95.5 3.8
Swiss franc 9.5 2.0 63.6 3.6 0.9 2.0 6.7 3.2 80.7 3.2
Canadian dollar 13.1 2.8 48.5 2.8 1.5 3.4 3.0 1.5 66.2 2.7
Hong Kong dollar 1.9 0.4 34.8 2.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.4 37.7 1.5
Swedish krona 4.3 0.9 28.1 1.6 0.3 0.8 1.5 0.7 34.2 1.4
New Zealand dollar 2.5 0.5 16.6 0.9 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.7 20.8 0.8
Korean won 9.0 1.9 8.3 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.8 0.9 19.6 0.8
Singapore dollar 2.2 0.5 16.8 1.0 0.0 0.1 1.4 0.7 20.4 0.8
Norwegian krone 3.1 0.6 15.8 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.5 20.1 0.8
Mexican peso 2.7 0.6 11.9 0.7 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.6 15.9 0.6
Indian rupee 6.8 1.4 3.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.9 12.1 0.5
Russian rouble 1.1 0.2 7.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 8.9 0.4
Chinese renminbi 7.1 1.5 3.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 2.5 1.2 13.1 0.5
Polish zloty 1.8 0.4 9.5 0.5 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.5 12.5 0.5
Turkish new lira 1.5 0.3 6.3 0.4 1.0 2.2 1.9 0.9 10.7 0.4
South African rand 1.4 0.3 7.8 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 9.8 0.4
Brazilian real 6.4 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 2.3 1.1 9.4 0.4
Danish krone 1.4 0.3 7.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 8.9 0.4
Hungarian forint 0.9 0.2 5.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.3 6.5 0.3
Malaysian ringgit 2.1 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 3.4 0.1
Thai baht 0.6 0.1 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.1
Other Currencies 24.4 5.1 39.7 2.2 3.2 7.4 8.9 4.3 76.2 3.1
All currencies 473.7 100 1,764 100 43.8 100 207.0 100 2,488 100
Total
Levels  Shares Levels  Shares Levels  Shares Levels  Shares Levels  Shares
Currency
Outright Forwards
Foreign Exchange 
Swaps
Currency Swaps
Options and Other 
instruments
 
Source: Bank of International Settlements, 2010 Triennial Central Bank Survey;  IMF  calculations. 
 
1/ Levels in billions of US dollars; shares in percentage of average daily turnover in April 2010.  
2/ Currency ranking based on average daily global foreign exchange market turnover in April 2010. 
 
 
Appendix Table A4. Countries Holding More than 5 percent of their Foreign Exchange  
Reserves in Each Currency 
Currency
U.S. dollars 114 97 120 95 120 94 118 94 120 96
Euro 86 73 90 71 90 71 87 70 85 68
Pound sterling 41 35 42 34 37 29 37 30 35 28
Japanese yen 19 16 17 14 16 13 20 16 21 17
Swiss francs 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Other currencies 22 19 38 30 45 35 55 44 56 45
Memorandum
118 100 126 100 127 100 125 100 125 100
Average 2001 - 2005 Average 2006 - 2010 2009 2010 2011 Q1
Member 
Countries
% of 
Reporting 
Countries
Member 
Countries
% of 
Reporting 
Countries
Number of Countries  Reporting Reserves
Member 
Countries
% of 
Reporting 
Countries
Member 
Countries
% of 
Reporting 
Countries
Member 
Countries
% of 
Reporting 
Countries
 
Source: IMF. Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER)  Appendix Table A5. Average Daily Foreign Exchange Spreads between Spot Bid and Ask Quotations 
against the US Dollar in New York 1/ 2/ 
(Percent of ask price quotation) 
Euro 0.0288 0.0161 0.0036
Japanese yen 0.0319 0.0130 0.0059
Danish krone 0.0396 0.0193 0.0062
Hong Kong dollar 0.0093 0.0115 0.0084
Canadian dollar 0.0386 0.0230 0.0119
Pound sterling 0.0254 0.0232 0.0141
Swiss franc 0.0302 0.0173 0.0156
Australian dollar 0.0574 0.0466 0.0159
Indian rupee 0.0759 0.0670 0.0230
Chinese renminbi 0.0206 0.0172 0.0276
Singapore dollar 0.0435 0.0671 0.0409
Mexican peso 0.0867 0.0716 0.0428
New Zealand dollar 0.0968 0.0800 0.0482
Norwegian krone 0.0519 0.0580 0.0492
Swedish krona 0.0521 0.0546 0.0501
Malaysian ringgit 0.0687 0.1105 0.0605
Turkish new lira 0.6232 0.2355 0.0975
Brazilian Real  0.0976 0.0859 0.0994
South African rand 0.3151 0.3195 0.1020
Polish zloty 0.1707 0.1977 0.1039
Hungarian forint 0.2318 0.2729 0.1089
Thai baht 0.1087 0.1938 0.1225
Korean won 0.1118 0.1164 0.1558
Russian rouble 0.1917 0.0790 0.2579
Currency 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011 3/
 
Source: Bloomberg and IMF Calculations. 
1/ Quotes shown reflect closing prices computed by Bloomberg as a composite of providers in New York. 
2/ Top 25 currencies based on average foreign exchange market turnover on April 2010. Currencies ranked based on average daily 
spreads for 2011.                                      3/ Data shown through July 28, 2011. 
 
 
Appendix Table A6. Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives: Currency Composition, 2001–10 1/ 2/ 
US dollar 2,031.0 37.4 6,439.1 44.5 6,177.8 38.4 7,149.3 41.8
Euro 2,222.3 41.0 4,974.0 34.3 6,504.5 40.4 6,270.3 36.7
Japanese yen 460.4 8.5 986.3 6.8 1,112.9 6.9 1,366.2 8.0
Pound sterling 311.1 5.7 979.0 6.8 1,179.2 7.3 1,004.9 5.9
Swiss franc 79.2 1.5 167.6 1.2 177.1 1.1 292.2 1.7
Canadian dollar 59.0 1.1 140.2 1.0 140.7 0.9 140.2 0.8
Australian dollar 24.3 0.4 103.5 0.7 97.8 0.6 141.2 0.8
Swedish krona 47.5 0.9 99.0 0.7 118.7 0.7 95.6 0.6
Norwegian krone 7.2 0.1 19.3 0.1 13.6 0.1 13.9 0.1
Hong Kong dollar 6.5 0.1 13.7 0.1 12.5 0.1 10.4 0.1
Danish krone 6.6 0.1 12.5 0.1 14.0 0.1 14.9 0.1
New Zealand dollar 0.2 0.0 3.5 0.0 4.9 0.0 3.6 0.0
Thai baht 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other currencies 169.1 3.1 547.5 3.8 535.8 3.3 588.0 3.4
Total 5,424.5 100.0 14,485.2 100.0 16,089.5 100.0 17,090.8 100.0
Shares Levels  Shares
Currency 3/
Average 2001 - 2005 Average 2006 - 2010 2009 2010
Levels  Shares Levels  Shares Levels 
 
Source: BIS Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics at end-December 2010, Tables 20B and 21B 
1/ Gross market values of OTC foreign exchange and single currency interest rate derivatives. For OTC foreign exchange derivatives 
values were divided by two because two currencies are involved in each transaction. 
2/ Levels in billions of US dollars; shares in percentage of the total. 
3/ Currency ranking is based on average 2006 - 2010 for total international debt securities.  
Figure A1. Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves: 2001 and 2011 /1 
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Source: IMF. Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) 
1/ Percent of total. Data for 2011 are for end-Q1. 
 
 
Figure A2. International Banking Liabilities—Currency Composition (2000–2011) /1 
(percent of total) 
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Source: BIS International Locational Banking Statistics. Table 5A (Quarterly Survey) 
1/ Data for 2011 as of first quarter Endnotes 
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